This paper studies the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained in perfect Bayesian equilibrium in repeated games with network monitoring, where players observe each other's actions either perfectly or not at all. The foundational result is that the maximum level of cooperation can be robustly sustained in grim trigger strategies. If players are equally well monitored, comparative statics on the maximum level of cooperation are highly tractable and depend on the monitoring technology only through a simple statistic, its e¤ ective contagiousness. Typically, cooperation in the provision of pure public goods is greater in larger groups, while cooperation in the provision of divisible public goods is greater in smaller groups, and making monitoring less uncertain in the second-order stochastic dominance sense increases cooperation. For …xed monitoring networks, a new notion of network centrality is developed, which determines which players cooperate more in a given network, as well as which networks support greater cooperation.
Relatedly, what kinds of groups can sustain the most cooperation? Large ones or small ones?
Ones where "who observes whom" in the group is known, or where it is uncertain?
These are fundamental questions in the social sciences (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Greif, 2006) . In economics, existing work on the theory of repeated games provides a framework for answering these questions when individuals can perfectly observe each other's actions (e.g., Abreu, 1988) , but provides much less explicit answers in the more realistic case where monitoring is imperfect. This weakness is particularly acute in settings where public signals are not very informative about each individual's actions and high quality-but dispersed-private signals are the basis for cooperation. Consider, for example, the problem of maintaining a school in a small village in the developing world. Every year, say, di¤erent villagers must contribute di¤erent inputs to running the school: some provide money, some provide labor to maintain the building, some volunteer in other capacities, etc. These inputs are not publicly observable, and di¤erent villagers observe each other's actions with di¤erent probabilities. The overall quality of the school is very hard to observe directly, and indeed one might not be able to infer much about it until one sees how well the students do years down the road, by which time the entire system of providing education in the village may have changed. This problem was studied theoretically and empirically (using data on schools and wells in rural Kenya) by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) , under the assumption that each household's contribution is publicly observable, but this assumption is often unrealistic; for example, Miguel and Gugerty emphasize the importance of ethnic divisions in the villages they study, so a natural assumption would be that a household is more likely to be monitored by households from the same ethnic group. A second example is the problem of cooperation in long-distance trade, argued by Greif and others to be an essential hurdle to the development of the modern economy. Here, a key issue is often how sharing information through network-like institutions like trading coalitions (Greif 1989 (Greif , 1993 , trade fairs (Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990) , and merchant guilds (Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994) facilitates cooperation. Thus, it is certainly plausible that local, private monitoring plays a larger role than public monitoring in sustaining cooperation in many interesting economic examples, and very little is known about how cooperation is best sustained under this sort of monitoring. This paper studies cooperation in repeated games with network monitoring, where in every period a network is independently drawn from a (possibly degenerate) known distribution, and players perfectly observe the actions of their neighbors but observe nothing about any other player's action. The model covers both monitoring on a …xed network (as when a household's actions are always observed by its geographic neighbors, or by households in the same ethnic group), and random matching (as when traders randomly meet in a large market). Each player's action is simply her level of cooperation, in that higher actions are privately costly but bene…t others.
The goal is to characterize the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained robustly in equilibrium, in that it can be sustained for any information that players may have about who has monitored whom in the past. This robustness criterion captures the perspective of an outside observer, who knows what information players have about each other's actions, but not what information players have about each other's information about actions (or about their information about others'information about actions, and so on), and who therefore must make predictions that are robust to this higher-order information. 1 A …rst observation is that for any given speci…cation of players'higher-order information, the strategies that sustain the maximum level of cooperation can depend on players'private information in complicated ways that involve a mix of rewards and punishments, and determining the maximum level of cooperation appears intractable. In contrast, my main theoretical result is that the robust maximum level of cooperation is always sustained by simple grim trigger strategies, where each player cooperates at a …xed level unless she ever observes another player fail to cooperate at his prescribed level, in which case she stops cooperating forever. Thus, robust cooperation is maximized through strategies that involve punishments but not rewards. In addition, grim trigger strategies also maximize cooperation when players have perfect knowledge of who observed whom in the past (as is the case when the monitoring network is …xed over time, for example); interestingly, it is when players have less higher-order information that more complicated strategies can do better than grim trigger. A rough intuition for these results is that when players know who observed whom in the past there is a kind of "strategic complementarity" in which a player is willing to cooperate more at any on-path history whenever another player cooperates more at any on-path history, because-with network monitoring and grim trigger strategies-shirking makes every onpath history less likely; but this strategic complementarity breaks down when players can disagree about who has observed whom.
This result about how groups can best sustain cooperation has implications for what groups can sustain the most cooperation. For these more applied results, I focus on two important special cases of network monitoring: equal monitoring, where in expectation players are monitored "equally well"; and …xed monitoring networks, where the monitoring network is …xed over time.
With equal monitoring, I show that the e¤ectiveness of a monitoring technology in supporting cooperation is completely determined by one simple statistic, its e¤ ective contagiousness, which is de…ned as 1 X t=0 t E [number of players who learn about a deviation within t periods] .
This result formalizes the simple idea that more cooperation can be sustained if news about a deviation spreads throughout the network more quickly. It implies that cooperation in the provision of pure public goods (where the marginal bene…t of cooperation is independent of group size) is increasing in group size if the expected number of players who learn about a deviation is increasing in group size, while cooperation in the provision of divisible public goods (where the marginal bene…t of cooperation is inversely proportional to group size) is increasing in group size if the expected fraction of players who learn about a deviation is increasing in group size. Hence, cooperation in the provision of pure public goods tends to be greater in larger groups, while cooperation in the provision of divisible public goods tends to be greater in smaller groups. In addition, making monitoring more "uncertain" in a certain sense reduces cooperation.
With …xed networks, I develop a new notion of network centrality that determines both which players cooperate more in a given network and which networks support more cooperation overall, thus linking the graph-theoretic property of centrality with the game-theoretic property of robust maximum cooperation. For example, adding links to the monitoring network necessarily increases all players' robust maximum cooperation, which formalizes the idea that individuals in betterconnected groups cooperate more.
The results of this paper may bear on questions in several …elds of economics. First, a literature in public economics studies the e¤ect of group size and structure on the maximum equilibrium level of public good provision. One strand of this literature studies repeated games, but characterizes maximum cooperation only with perfect monitoring. Papers in this strand have found few unambiguous relationships between group size and structure and maximum cooperation. 2 A second 2 Pecorino (1999) shows that with perfect monitoring public good provision is easier in large groups, because shirking-and thus causing everyone else to start shirking-is more costly in large groups. Haag and Laguno¤ (2007) show that with heterogeneous discount factors and a restriction to stationary strategies, maximum cooperation is increasing in group size. Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) consider imperfect public monitoring, and present numerical evidence evidence suggesting that higher payo¤s can be sustained in small groups when attention is restricted to trigger strategies. In a second paper, Bendor and Mookherjee (1990) allow for network structure but return to the strand studies one-shot games of public good provision in networks (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou, 2006; Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007a; Bramoullé, Kranton, and D'Amours, 2011), where the network determines local payo¤ interactions-and, in particular, incentives for free-riding-rather than monitoring. These papers …nd that more central players (measured by Bonacich centrality or a modi…cation thereof) cooperate less and receive higher payo¤s, due to free-riding, and that adding links to a network decreases average maximum cooperation, by increasing free-riding.
In contrast, my model, which combines elements from both strands of the literature, makes the following predictions, which are made precise later:
1. Cooperation in the provision of pure public goods is greater in larger groups, while cooperation in the provision of divisible public goods is greater in smaller groups.
2. Less uncertain monitoring increases cooperation.
3. More central players cooperate more (unlike in the public goods in networks literature) but still receive higher payo¤s with local public goods (like in that literature).
Adding links to a monitoring network increases all players'cooperation.
Second, several seminal papers in institutional economics study the role of di¤erent institutions in sharing information about past behavior to facilitate trade (Greif, 1989 (Greif, , 1993 Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994) . Ellison (1994) notes that the models underlying these studies resemble a prisoner's dilemma, and shows that cooperation is sustainable in the prisoner's dilemma with random matching for su¢ ciently patient players, which suggests that information-sharing institutions are not always necessary. The current paper contributes to this literature by determining the maximum level of cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma-like game at any …xed discount factor for any network monitoring technology. Thus, it allows one to determine the exactly how much more cooperation can be sustained in the presence of a given information-sharing institution.
Third, a young and very active literature in development economics studies the impact of network structure on di¤erent kinds of cooperation, such as favor exchange (Karlan et Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2011) …nd that favor-exchange networks in rural India exhibit high support, the property that linked players share at least one common neighbor. While it seems natural that support (which is the key determinant of cooperation in Jackson, RodriguezBarraquer, and Tan's model) should be correlated with robust maximum cooperation in my model, I leave studying the precise empirical relationship between the two concepts for future research.
A few …nal comments on related literature: It should be noted that the aforementioned paper of Ellison (1994) , along with much of the related literature (e.g., Kandori, 1992; Deb, 2009; Takahashi, 2010 ) focuses on the case of su¢ ciently high discount factors and does not characterize e¢ cient equilibria at …xed discount factors, unlike my paper. In addition, a key concern in these papers is ensuring that players do not cooperate o¤ the equilibrium path. The issue is that grim trigger strategies may provide such strong incentives to cooperate on-path that players prefer to cooperate even after observing a deviation. Ellison resolves this problem by introducing a "relenting"version of grim trigger strategies tailored to make players indi¤erent between cooperating and shirking on-path, and then noting that cooperation is more appealing on-path than o¤-path (since o¤-path at least one opponent is already shirking). This issue does not arise in my analysis because, with continuous action spaces, players must be just indi¤erent between cooperating and shirking on-path in the most cooperative equilibrium, as otherwise they could be asked to cooperate slightly more.
By essentially the same argument as in Ellison, this implies that players weakly prefer to shirk o¤-path. Hence, the key contribution of this paper is showing that grim trigger strategies provide the strongest possible incentives for (robust) cooperation on-path, not that they provide incentives for shirking o¤-path. 3 The most closely related paper is contemporaneous and independent work by Ali and Miller (2011) . Ali and Miller study a network game in which links between players are recognized according to a Poisson process. When a link is recognized, the linked players play a prisoner's dilemma with variable stakes, and can also make transfers to each other. Like my model, Ali and Miller's features smooth actions and payo¤s, so that, with grim trigger strategies, binding on-path incentive constraints imply slack o¤-path incentive constraints. The most important di¤erence 3 Another di¤erence is that it is important for the current paper that in each period the monitoring network is observed after actions are chosen, whereas this timing does not matter in most papers on community enforcement. between Ali and Miller's paper and mine is that they do not show that grim trigger strategies always maximize cooperation in their model. Ali and Miller also do not emphasize strategic complementarity or robustness to higher-order information. They do however discuss network formation and comparisons among networks, developing insights that are complementary to mine.
Finally, this paper is related more broadly to the study of repeated games with private monitoring. Most papers in this literature study much more general models than mine, and either prove folk theorems or study robustness to small deviations from public monitoring Morris, 2002, 2006; Sugaya and Takahashi, 2011) . 4 However, to my knowledge this is the …rst paper that characterizes even a single point on the Pareto frontier of the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium payo¤s in a repeated game with imperfect private monitoring where …rst-best payo¤s are not attainable. I make no attempt to characterize the entire set of perfect Bayesian equilibria, or any large subset thereof. Instead, I use the strategic complementarity discussed above to derive an upper bound on each player's maximum cooperation, and then show that this bound can be attained with grim trigger strategies. It would be interesting to see if similar indirect approaches, perhaps also based on strategic complementarity, can be useful in other classes of repeated games with private monitoring of applied interest.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the key result that maximum cooperation is robustly sustained in grim trigger strategies. Section 4 derives comparative statics in games with equal monitoring. Section 5 studies games with …xed monitoring networks. Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for future research. Major omitted proofs and examples are in the appendix, and minor ones are in the online appendix.
Model
There is a set N = f1; : : : ; ng of players. In every period t 2 N = f0; 1; : : :g, every player i simultaneously chooses an action ("level of cooperation," "contribution") x i 2 R + . The players have common discount factor 2 (0; 1). If the players choose actions x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) in period t, player i's period-t payo¤ is
where the functions f i;j : R + ! R + satisfy 4 Of the many private monitoring folk theorem papers, the most related are probably Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) and Renault and Tomala (1998) , which assume a …xed monitoring network. f i;j (0) = 0, f i;j is non-decreasing, and f i;j is either strictly concave or identically 0.
The assumption that f i;j is non-decreasing for all i 6 = j is essential for interpreting x j as player j's level of cooperation. Note that the stage game is a prisoner's dilemma, in that playing x i = 0 ("shirking") is a dominant strategy for player i in the stage game. The second assumption states that the cost of cooperation becomes in…nitely greater than the bene…t for su¢ ciently high levels of cooperation. Concavity and the assumption that u i (x) is separable in (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) play important roles in the analysis, and are discussed below.
Every period t, a monitoring network L t = (l i;j;t ) i;j2N N , l i;j;t 2 f0; 1g, is drawn independently from a …xed probability distribution on f0; 1g
. In addition, higher-order information y t = (y i;t ) i2N , y i;t 2 Y i is drawn independently from a probability distribution (y t jL t ), where the Y i are arbitrary …nite sets. At the end of period t, player i observes h i;t = fz i;1;t ; : : : ; z i;n;t ; y i;t g, where z i;j;t = x j;t if l i;j;t = 1, and z i;j;t = ; if l i;j;t = 0. That is, player i observes the action of each of her out-neighbors and also observes the signal y i;t , which may contain information about who observes whom in period t (as well as information about others'information about who observes whom, and so on). 5 The special case of perfect higher-order information is when y i;t = L t with probability 1 for all i 2 N ; this is the case where who observes whom is common knowledge (while monitoring of actions remains private). Assume that Pr (l i;i = 1) = 1 for all i 2 N ; that is, there is perfect recall. A repeated game with such a monitoring structure has network monitoring, the distribution is the monitoring technology, and the pair (Y = Y 1 : : : Y n ; ) is the higher-order information structure. Let h t i (h i;0 ; h i;1 ; : : : ; h i;t 1 ) be player i's private history at time t 1, and denote the null history at the beginning of the game by h 0 = h 0 i for all i. A (behavior) strategy of player i's, i , speci…es a probability distribution over period t actions as a function of h t i . Many important repeated games have network monitoring, including random matching (as in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) ) and monitoring on a …xed network (where L t is deterministic and 5 As to whether players observe their realized stage-game payo¤s, note that fi;j (xj) can be interpreted as player i's expected bene…t from player j's action, and player i may only bene…t from player j's action when li;j;t = 1. However, some combinations of assumptions on fi;j and are not consistent with this interpretation, such as monitoring on a …xed network with global public goods, where Pr (li;j;t = 1) = 0 but fi;j 6 = 0 for some i; j. An alternative interpretation is required in these cases: for example, the in…nite time horizon could be replaced with an uncertain …nite horizon without discounting, with payo¤s revealed at the end of the game and viewed as the probability of the game's continuing. The former interpretation is appropriate for the long-distance trade example, while the alternative interpretation is appropriate for the school example.
constant, see Section 5). For random matching, by changing the higher-order information structure the model can allow for the case where players learn nothing about who matches with whom outside their own matches (Y i = ; for all i), the case where who matches with whom is common knowledge (y i;t = L t with probability 1 for all i), or any intermediate case. For monitoring on a …xed network, however, players already know who matches with whom, so higher-order information is irrelevant (although technically higher-order information could still act as a correlating device in this case).
To …x ideas, note that a repeated game in which players observe the actions of their neighbors on a random graph that is determined in period 0 and then …xed for the duration of play does not have network monitoring, because the monitoring network is not drawn independently every period (e.g., player i observes player j's action in period 1 with probability 1 if she observes it in period 0, but she does not observe player j's action with probability 1 in period 0).
Throughout, I study weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this model with the property that, for every player i, time t, and monitoring network L t 0 , for t 0 < t, the sum
jL t 0 exists. 6 This technical restriction ensures that players'continuation payo¤s are well-de…ned, conditional on any past realized monitoring network. Fixing a description of the model other than the higher-order information structure-that is, a tuple N; (f i;j ) i;j2N N ; ; -let P BE (Y; ) be the set of PBE strategy pro…les when the higher-order information structure is (Y; ). Player i's level of cooperation under strategy pro…le is de…ned to be (1 )
The main object of interest is the highest level of cooperation for each player that can be sustained in PBE for any higher-order information structure.
De…nition 1 Player i's maximum cooperation with higher-order information structure (Y; ) is
Player i's robust maximum cooperation is the highest level of cooperation that is sure to be sustainable in PBE for a given stage game, discount factor, and monitoring technology. Put 6 Recall that a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy pro…le and belief system in which, for every player i and private history h , and these beliefs are updated using Bayes'rule whenever possible. di¤erently, it is the highest level of cooperation that an outside observer who does not know the higher-order information structure can be sure is sustainable. This seems reasonable for applications like local public good provision or long-range trade, where it seems much more palatable to make assumptions only about the probability that players observe each other's actions (the monitoring technology), rather than also making assumptions about what players observe about each other's observations, what they observe about what others observe about this, and so on. 7 One more de…nition: a strategy pro…le is higher-order information free if i h t i does not depend on (y i; ) t 1 =0 for all i 2 N . A higher-order information free strategy pro…le can naturally be viewed as a strategy pro…le in the game corresponding to any higher-order information structure (Y; ). So the following de…nition makes sense. This de…nition is demanding, in that a strategy pro…le can robustly sustain a level of cooperation only if it is a PBE for any higher-order information structure. However, my main theoretical result (Theorem 1) shows that there exists a grim trigger strategy pro…le that robustly sustains all players' robust maximum cooperation simultaneously (and the applied analysis in Sections 4 and 5 then focuses on this equilibrium). The resulting equilibrium is particularly important when it is also the PBE that maximizes social welfare. This is the primary case of interest in the literature on public good provision, where the focus is on providing incentives for su¢ cient cooperation, rather than on avoiding providing incentives for excessive cooperation. For example, the grim trigger strategy pro…le that simultaneously robustly sustains each player's maximum cooperation also maximizes utilitarian social welfare if x i is below the …rst-best level (Lindahl-Samuelson benchmark) for every i 2 N . Letting f 0 j;i denote the left-derivative of f j;i (which exists by concavity of f j;i ), this su¢ cient condition is
This condition can be checked easily using the formula for (x i ) n i=1 given by Theorem 1. 8 As a consequence, when this condition holds, all of the comparative statics on robust maximum cooper- 7 However, I have implicitly assumption that the higher-order information structure is common knowledge among the players. But relaxing this would not a¤ect the results. 8 It would of course be desirable to characterize the entire set of payo¤s that can be robustly sustained in PBE, or at least the entire Pareto frontier of this set, rather than only the equilibrium that robustly sustains maximum ation derived below are also comparative statics on ine¢ ciency relative to the Lindahl-Samuelson benchmark. I also present some quantitative examples of the relationship between ine¢ ciency and network structure in Sections 4 and 5.
Before beginning the analysis, let me remark brie ‡y on the motivation for studying this model.
The model is intended to capture the essential features of cooperation in settings like those discussed in the introduction. Consider again the example of maintaining a school in a small village. In this setting, it is natural to think that villagers sometimes observe each other's contributions quite accurately but sometimes do not observe them at all (e.g., a villager might usually know how hard her friends have been working on the school, and might occasionally see someone else working, or learn that someone else has contributed money), and that it is very hard to observe the school's overall quality (e.g., because school quality might be best measured by students' labor market outcomes in the distant future). This suggests that repeated game models with (possibly imperfect) pure public monitoring are not well-suited for studying cooperation in this setting. My model instead makes the opposite assumption of pure network monitoring, and this leads to predictions that are very di¤erent from those that would emerge with imperfect public monitoring; for example, none of the four predictions enumerated in the introduction have been made in the literature on repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, and those predictions that relate a player's location in a monitoring network to her maximum cooperation cannot possibly be made in such models. It will become clear that my model is also very tractable: given a monitoring technology, it is easy to calculate each player's robust maximum cooperation. Of course, allowing players to access both network monitoring and noisy public monitoring-which is certainly more realistic than either pure public monitoring or pure network monitoring-remains a very interesting direction for future research. I discuss this possibility further in the conclusion.
Characterization of Robust Maximum Cooperation
This section presents the main theoretical result of the paper, which shows that all players'robust maximum cooperation can be robustly sustained in grim trigger strategies. To further motivate the focus on robustness, Section 3.1 presents an example showing that, with a given higher-order information structure, maximum cooperation may be sustained by complicated strategies that seem cooperation. However, this problem appears intractable, just as it seems intractable in general repeated games with imperfect private monitoring (for …xed , rather than in the ! 1 limit). 
Optimality of Complex Strategies with Imperfect Higher-Order Information
This section shows by example that for some higher-order information structures a player's maximum level of cooperation cannot be sustained in (stationary) grim trigger strategies. I sketch the example here and defer the details to the appendix.
There are three players, arranged as in Figure 1 . Player 1 is observed by player 2 with probability 1=2 and is never observed by player 3. Players 2 and 3 always observe each other. Player 1 always plays x 1 = 0:2505 on-path. Players 2 and 3 each have two on-path actions,
At subsequent odd-numbered periods t, player 2 plays x H 2 with probability 1 if he observed player 1's period-t 1 action, and otherwise plays each of x H 2 and x L 2 with probability 1=2. At subsequent even-numbered periods t, player 2 plays x H 2 with probability 1 if he observed player 1's period-t 2 action, and otherwise plays each of x H 2 and x L 2 with probability 1=2. Thus, if player 2 observes player 1's action in even-numbered period t, he then plays x H 2 with probability 1 in both periods t + 1 and t + 2. Finally, player 3 plays x 3 = x H 3 in period 0, and in every period t 1 he plays x H 3 if player 2 played x H 2 in period t 1, and plays x L 3 if player 2 played x L 2 in period t 1. If any player i observes a deviation from this speci…cation of on-path play (i.e., if any player deviates herself; if player 2 observes x 1 6 = 0:2505 or observes player 3 failing to take her prescribed action; or if player 3 observes x 2 = 2 x L 2 ; x H 2 ), she then plays x i = 0 in all subsequent periods. In the
, and x H 3 , and verify that the resulting strategy pro…le is a PBE. Why can strategies of this form sustain greater maximum cooperation by player 1 than grim trigger strategies can? The key is that the di¤erence between player 1's expectation of player 3's average future cooperation when player 1 cooperates and when player 1 shirks, conditional on the event that player 2 observes player 1 (which is the only event that matters for player 1's incentives), is larger than with grim trigger strategies. To understand this, consider what happens after period 2 sees player 1 play 0:2505 in period t 1, for t odd. Conditional on this event, player 1's expectation of player 3's action in both periods t + 1 and t + 2 equals x H 3 ; but player 3's expectation of his own action in period t + 2 after seeing player 2 play x H 2 in period t is less than x H 3 , because he is not sure that player 2 observed player 1 in period t 1. Indeed, if player 3 were sure that player 2 had observed player 1 in period t 1, he would not be willing to play x H 3 (as he would have to play x H 3 in period t + 2 in addition to t + 1). Thus, the disagreement between player 1's expectation of player 3's average future cooperation (conditional on player 2 observing player 1) and player 3's (unconditional) expectation of his own average future cooperation improves player 1's incentive to cooperate without causing player 3 to shirk.
Note that all this example directly proves is that player 1's maximum cooperation is not sustainable in grim trigger strategies. However, it is not hard to show that any strategies that sustain more cooperation than is possible with grim trigger must involve "rewards,"in that on-path actions must sometimes increase from one period to the next. This observation places a lower bound on how "complicated" the strategies that do sustain player 1's maximum cooperation in the example must be, even though actually computing these strategies seems intractable. 9 
Robust Optimality of Grim Trigger Strategies
This section shows that all players'robust maximum cooperation can be robustly sustained in grim trigger strategies, de…ned as follows.
De…nition 3 A strategy pro…le is a grim trigger strategy pro…le if there exist actions
such that i h t i = x i if z i;j; 2 fx j ; ;g for all z i;j; 2 h i; and all < t, and i h t i = 0 otherwise.
In a grim trigger strategy pro…le player i's action at an o¤-path history h t i does not depend on the identity of the initial deviator. In particular, by perfect recall, player i plays x i = 0 in every 9 It is also trivial to modify this example to show that a player's payo¤ need not be maximized by grim trigger strategies: simply add a fourth player, observed by no one, who only values player 1's contributions. period following a deviation by player i herself. Also, if a grim trigger strategy pro…le sustains each player's robust maximum cooperation, then under each player i plays x i at every on-path history. Finally, grim trigger strategy pro…les are clearly higher-order information free.
Next, I introduce an important piece of notation: de…ne D ( ; t; i) recursively by
That is, D ( ; t; i) is the set of players in period who have observed a player who has observed a player who has observed. . . player i since time t. By perfect recall, D ( + 1; t; i) D ( ; t; i) for all , t, and i. The set D ( ; t; i) is important because j 2 D ( ; t; i) is a necessary condition for player j's time history to vary with player i's actions at times after t. In particular, if players are using grim trigger strategies and player i shirks at time t, then D ( ; t; i) is the set of players who shirk at time . Note that the probability distribution of D ( ; t; i) is the same as the probability
, for all i and t.
I now state the main theoretical result of the paper.
Theorem 1 There is a grim trigger strategy pro…le that robustly sustains each player's robust maximum cooperation. Furthermore, the vector of players'robust maximum cooperation
such that
Given that grim trigger strategies sustain each player's robust maximum cooperation, equation (1) is almost immediate: the left-hand side of (1) is the cost to player i of conforming to ; and the right-hand side of (1) is the bene…t to player i of conforming to , which is that, if player i deviated, she would lose her bene…t from player j's cooperation whenever j 2 D (t; i). Thus, (1) states that the vector of robust maximum cooperation is the greatest vector of actions that equalizes the cost and bene…t of cooperation for each player. In addition, it is easy to compute
, as discussed in footnote 21 in the appendix. Thus, the substance of Theorem 1 is showing that grim trigger strategies sustain each player's robust maximum cooperation. As shown above, grim trigger strategies do not sustain each player's maximum cooperation with every higher-order information structure. However, if one shows that a grim trigger strategy pro…le sustains each player i's maximum cooperation x i with some higherorder information structure, then this implies that both x i x i (by de…nition of x i ) and x i x i (because must robustly sustain x i ), 10 so Theorem 1 follows. Hence, the following key lemma implies Theorem 1.
Lemma 1
The grim trigger strategy pro…le with on-path actions given by (1) sustains each player's maximum cooperation with perfect higher-order information.
Lemma 1 is also of interest in its own right, as it shows that grim trigger strategies maximize cooperation when higher-order information is perfect. For example, Lemma 1 implies that grim trigger strategies always maximize cooperation for …xed monitoring networks, as with …xed monitoring networks who observes whom is always common knowledge. Since grim trigger strategies are higher-order information free, Lemma 1 also implies that each player's maximum cooperation with perfect higher-order information is weakly less than her maximum cooperation with any other higher-order information structure.
The key idea behind Lemma 1 is that a player is willing to cooperate (weakly) more at any onpath history if any other player cooperates more at any on-path history, because the …rst player is more likely to bene…t from this increased cooperation when she conforms than when she deviates. 11 Thus, there is a kind of strategic complementarity between the actions of any two players at any two on-path histories. This suggests the following "proof" of Lemma 1: De…ne a function that maps the vector of all players' on-path actions at every on-path history,x, to the vector of the highest actions that each player is willing to take at each on-path history when actions at all other on-path histories are as inx, and players shirk at o¤-path histories. Let X be an action greater than any on-path PBE action, and letX be the vector of on-path actions X. By complementarity among on-path actions, iterating onX yields a sequence of vectors of on-path actions that are all constant across periods and weakly greater than the greatest …xed point of , and this sequence converges monotonically to the greatest …xed point of . Therefore, the greatest …xed point of is constant across periods, and it provides an upper bound on each player's maximum cooperation.
Finally, verify that the grim trigger strategy pro…le with on-path actions given by the greatest …xed 1 0 It is not di¢ cult to show that if a grim trigger strategy pro…le sustains a player's maximum cooperation xi with some higher-order information structure then it robustly sustains xi. See the appendix. 1 1 This observation relies on the assumption of network monitoring, since otherwise a deviation by the …rst player may make some on-path histories more likely.
point of is a PBE. 12 The problem with this "proof" (and there must be a problem, because the "proof" does not mention perfect higher-order information) is that, while the highest action that a player is willing to take at any on-path history is non-decreasing in every other player's on-path actions, it is decreasing in her own future on-path actions. That is, a player is not willing to cooperate as much today when she knows that she will be asked to cooperate more tomorrow. Hence, the function as de…ned in the previous paragraph is not isotone, and thus may not have a greatest …xed point. This problem may be addressed by working not with players' stage-game actions i h t i , but rather with their "continuation actions"
for every player i and on-path history h t i . The intuition for this inequality is that, if player i shirks at time t, then player j starts shirking at time with probability Pr (j 2 D ( ; t; i) nD ( 1; t; i)), and this yields lost bene…ts of at least
This inequality yields an upper bound on player i's expected continuation action, E X t i jh t i , in terms of her expectation of other players' continuation actions only. This raises the possibility that the function could be isotone when de…ned in terms of continuation actions X t i , rather than stage-game actions. For an approach along these lines to work, however, one must be able to
for player j's private histories h j . With perfect higher-order information (but not otherwise),
so such an approach is possible. 13 
Equal Monitoring
This section imposes the assumption that all players'actions are equally well-monitored in a sense that leads to sharp comparative statics results. In particular, assume throughout this section: 1 2 For this last step, one might be concerned that grim trigger strategies do not satisfy o¤-path incentive constraints, as a player might want to cooperate o¤-path in order to slow the "contagion" of defecting, as in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) . As discussed in the introduction, this problem does not arise with continuous actions and payo¤s. 1 3 The assumptions that payo¤s are concave and separable are also necessary. Without concavity, PBE actions could be scaled up inde…nitely. Without separability, higher cooperation may be sustained when players take turns cooperating (see Example A1 in the online appendix).
Parallel Bene…t Functions:
There exists a function f : R + ! R + and scalars i;j 2 R + such that f i;j (x) = i;j f (x) for all i; j 2 N and all x 2 R + .
Equal Monitoring:
Parallel bene…t functions imply that the importance of player j's cooperation to player i may be summarized by a real number i;j . With this assumption, equal monitoring states that the expected discounted number of players who may be in ‡uenced by player i's action, weighted by the importance of their actions to player i, is the same for all i 2 N . To help interpret these assumptions, note that if i;j is constant across players i and j then, for generic discount factors , equal monitoring holds if and only if E [#D (t; i)] = E [#D (t; j)] for all i; j 2 N and t 2 N; that is, if and only if the expected number of players who …nd out about shirking by player i within t periods is the same for all i 2 N . Section 4.1 derives a simple and general formula for comparative statics on robust maximum cooperation under equal monitoring. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 apply this formula to the leading special case of (global) public good provision, where i;j = for all i 6 = j; that is, where all players value each other's actions equally. Section 4.2 studies the e¤ect of group size on public good provision, and Section 4.3 considers the e¤ect of "uncertainty" in monitoring on public good provision.
Finally, the higher-order information structure plays no role in this section or the following one, because these sections study comparative statics on players'maximum robust cooperation, which is independent of the higher-order information structure by de…nition.
Comparative Statics Under Equal Monitoring
The section derives a formula for comparative statics on robust maximum cooperation under equal monitoring. The …rst step is noting that each player's robust maximum cooperation is the same under equal monitoring (proof in appendix).
Corollary 1 With equal monitoring, x i = x j for all i; j 2 N .
Thus, under equal monitoring each player has the same robust maximum cooperation x . I wish to characterize when x is higher in one game than another, when both games satisfy equal monitoring and have the same underlying bene…t function f . Formally, a game with equal monitoring = N; ( i;j ) i;j2N N ; ; is a model satisfying the assumptions of Section 2 as well as equal monitoring. For any game with equal monitoring , let x ( ) be the robust maximum cooperation in , and let
be player i's bene…t of cooperation (i.e., the right-hand side of (1)) when f (x j ) = 1 for all j 2 N , which is independent of the choice of i 2 N by equal monitoring. The comparative statics result for games with equal monitoring is the following:
Theorem 2 Let 0 and be two games with equal monitoring. Then
Proof. Since x i = x for all i 2 N , (1) may be rewritten as
Hence, x ( ) is the greatest zero of the concave function 
The E¤ect of Group Size on Global Public Good Provision
This section uses Theorem 2 to analyze the e¤ect of group size on robust maximum cooperation in the leading special case of global public good provision, where i;j = for all i 6 = j.
In the case of (global) public good provision,
Thus, for public goods, all the information needed to determine whether changing the game increases or decreases the (robust) maximum per capita level of public good provision is contained in the product of two terms: the marginal bene…t to each player of public good provision, , and (1= (1 ) less than) the e¤ ective contagiousness of the monitoring technology,
Information such as group size, higher moments of the distribution of #D (t; i), and which players are more likely to observe which other players are not directly relevant. In particular, the single number P 1 t=0 t E [#D (t; i)]-the e¤ective contagiousness-completely determines the e¤ectiveness of a monitoring technology in supporting public good provision.
This …nding that comparative statics on the per-capita level of public good provision are determined by the product of the marginal bene…t of the public good to each player and the e¤ective contagiousness of the monitoring technology yields useful intuitions about the e¤ect of group size on the per capita level of public good provision. In particular, index a game by its group size, n, and write (n) for the corresponding marginal bene…t of contributions and
for the e¤ective contagiousness (I use this simpler notation for the remainder of this section). Normally, one would expect (n) to be decreasing in n (a larger population reduces player i's bene…t from player j's contribution to the public good) and P 1 t=0 t E [#D (t; n)] to be increasing in n (a larger population makes it more likely that player i's action is observed by more individuals), yielding a tradeo¤ between the marginal bene…t of contributions and the e¤ective contagiousness.
Consider again the example of constructing a local infrastructure project, like a well. In this case, (n) is likely to be decreasing and concave: since each individual uses the well only occasionally, there are few externalities among the …rst few individuals, but eventually it starts to becomes dif…cult to …nd times when the well is available, water shortages become a problem, etc.. Similarly,
] is likely to be increasing, and may be concave if there are "congestion"e¤ects in monitoring. Thus, it seems likely that in typical applications (n)
and therefore per capita public good provision, is maximized at an intermediate value of n.
Theorem 2 yields particularly simple comparative statics for the leading cases of pure public goods ( (n) = 1) and divisible public goods ( (n) = 1=n), which are useful in examples below.
Corollary 2 With pure public goods (
With pure public goods, x (n) is increasing unless monitoring degrades so quickly as n increases that the expected number of players who …nd out about a deviation within t periods is decreasing in n, for some t. This suggests that x (n) is increasing in n in many applications.
Corollary 3 With divisible public goods (
for some t 1 and x (n 0 ) > 0.
With divisible public goods, x (n) is increasing only if the expected fraction of players (other than the deviator herself) who …nd out about a deviation within t periods is non-decreasing in n, for all t. This suggests that, with divisible public goods, x (n) is decreasing in many applications.
The following two examples demonstrate the usefulness of Theorem 2 and Corollaries 2 and 3.
An earlier version of this paper (available upon request) contains additional examples.
Random Matching
Monitoring is random matching if in each period every player is linked with one other player at random, and l i;j;t = l j;i;t for all i; j 2 N and all t. This is possible only if n is even.
It can be show that, with random matching, E [#D (t; n)] is non-decreasing in n and is increasing in n for t = 2. Therefore, Corollary 2 implies that, with pure public goods, robust maximum cooperation is increasing in group size.
Proposition 1 With random matching and pure public goods, if n 0 > n then x (n 0 ) x (n), with strict inequality if x (n 0 ) > 0.
However, it can also be shown that
whenever n 0 > n, n 0 and n are su¢ ciently large, and < 1=2. In this case, Theorem 2 implies that, with divisible public goods, robust maximum cooperation is decreasing in group size.
Proposition 2 With random matching and divisible public goods, if < 1 2 then, for any > 0, there exists N such that x (n 0 ) x (n) if n 0 > (1 + ) n N , with strict inequality if x (n 0 ) > 0.
Monitoring on a Circle
Monitoring is on a circle if the players are arranged in a …xed circle and there exists an integer d 1 such that l i;j;t = 1 if and only if the distance between i and j is at most d.
It is a straightforward consequence of Corollary 2 that robust maximum cooperation is increasing in group size with monitoring on a circle and pure public goods.
Proposition 3 With monitoring on a circle and pure public goods, if n 0 > n then x (n 0 ) x (n), with strict inequality if x (n 0 ) > 0.
In contrast, Corollary 3 implies that robust maximum cooperation is decreasing in group size with monitoring on a circle and divisible public goods.
Proposition 4
With monitoring on a circle and divisible public goods, if n 0 > n then x (n 0 )
x (n), with strict inequality if d < n 0 =2 and x (n 0 ) > 0.
Finally, monitoring on a circle is a simple test case in which to compare robust maximum cooperation with the …rst-best (Lindahl-Samuelson) benchmark, for various discount factors and group sizes. Assume that n is odd, and consider …rst the case of pure public goods, with f (x) = p x.
Then …rst-best cooperation is given by
Robust maximum cooperation is given by equation (1) (or by the simpler equation (2) of Section 5.1), which yields
The following table displays robust maximum cooperation for various combinations of and n. For comparison, …rst-best cooperation does not depend on , and equals 25 when n = 11, 225 when n = 31, 2500 when n = 101, and 250,000 when n = 1001. Several remarks are in order here. First, robust maximum cooperation is less than …rst-best cooperation for all combinations of and n other than ( = :9; n = 11) and ( = :99; n 2 f11; 31; 101g). Thus, the equilibrium that sustains robust maximum cooperation also maximizes utilitarian social welfare, unless players are very patient and the group is relatively small. Second, robust maximum cooperation falls far short of the …rst-best benchmark in large groups, unless players are very patient. Third, network structure matters: for example, if the monitoring network is a clique rather than a circle (i.e., if monitoring is perfect), then robust maximum cooperation is given by x = ( (n 1)) 2 , and hence …rst-best cooperation can be sustained whenever 1=2. Finally, all of these conclusions also hold for the case of divisible public goods, as with divisible public goods both x F B and x are given by dividing the corresponding quantities with pure public goods by n 2 .
The E¤ect of Uncertain Monitoring on Global Public Good Provision
This section provides a result comparing monitoring technologies in terms of the maximum level of (robust) global public good provision they support, for a …xed group size. As discussed in the previous subsection, a monitoring technology supports greater robust maximum cooperation in global public good provision if and only if it has greater e¤ective contagiousness,
where the parameter n is omitted because it is held …xed in this subsection. I compare "less certain" monitoring, where it is likely that either a large or small fraction about the population …nds out about a deviation, with "more certain"monitoring, where it is likely that an intermediate fraction of the population …nds out about it, in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. Under fairly broad conditions, more certain monitoring supports greater robust maximum cooperation.
The analysis of this subsection relies on the following assumption, which states that the distribution over #D (t + 1) depends only on #D (t).
There exists a family of functions fg k : f0; : : : ; ng ! [0; 1]g n k=1 with such that, whenever #D (t) = k, Pr (#D (t + 1) = k 0 ) = g k (k 0 ), for all t, k, and k 0 . This assumption is satis…ed by random matching, for example, but not by monitoring on a circle, because with monitoring on a circle the distribution of #D (t + 1) depends on the identities of the of the members of D (t).
Given a probability mass function g k , de…ne the corresponding distribution function
Recall that a distributionG k strictly second-order stochastically dominates
for all increasing and strictly concave functions : R ! R. The following result compares monitoring under fg k g n k=1 and fg k g n k=1 .
Theorem 3 Suppose thatG k (k 0 ) and G k (k 0 ) are decreasing and strictly convex in k for k 2 f0; : : : ; k 0 g and k 0 2 f0; : : : ; ng, and thatG k strictly second-order stochastically dominates G k for k 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g. Then robust maximum cooperation is strictly greater under a monitoring technology corresponding to fg k ( )g n k=1 than under a monitoring technology corresponding to fg k ( )g n k=1 .
The intuition for Theorem 3 is fairly simple: IfG k strictly second-order stochastically dominates G k for all k, then underG k it is more likely that an intermediate number of players …nd out about an initial deviation each period. Since G k (k 0 ) andG k (k 0 ) are decreasing and convex in k, the expected number of players who …nd out about the deviation within t periods increases in t more quickly when it is more likely that an intermediate number of players …nd out about the deviation each period. Hence, P 1 t=0 t E [#D (t)] is strictly higher under a monitoring technology corresponding to fg k ( )g n k=1 than under a monitoring technology corresponding to fg k ( )g n k=1 , and the theorem then follows from Theorem 2.
Fixed Monitoring Networks
This section studies both global and local public good provision with network monitoring when the monitoring network is …xed over time. That is, throughout this section I make the following assumption on the (deterministic) monitoring technology.
Fixed Undirected Monitoring Network:
There exists a network L = (l i;j ) (i;j)2N N such that l i;j;t = l i;j = l j;i for all t.
I also assume that the stage game satis…es one of the following two properties, where N (i) is the set of player i's neighbors in L.
Global Public Goods:
The extensions of all of the results in this section to directed networks is straightforward. I discuss below where the assumption of global or local public goods can be relaxed.
Section 5.1 introduces a new de…nition of centrality in networks, and uses Theorem 1 to show that more central players have greater robust maximum cooperation. Section 5.2 shows that centrality can also be used to determine when one network "dominates"another in terms of supporting cooperation. Finally, Section 5.3 remarks on the stability of monitoring networks, emphasizing di¤erences between the cases of global and local public goods. there exists k 0 2 1 (k) such that k 0 is s 1-more central than k. Player i is strictly s-more central than player j if in addition k 0 is strictly s 1-more central than k for some t, , k, and k 0 .
Centrality and Robust Maximum Cooperation
Player i is more central than player j if i is s-more central than j for all s 2 N. Player i is strictly more central than player j if in addition i is strictly s-more central than j for some s 2 N. The main result of this section states that, with either global or local public goods, more central players have greater robust maximum cooperation, regardless of the discount factor and bene…t function f . The result can easily be generalized to allow for utility functions intermediate between global and local public goods, where a player's bene…t from another player's action is a decreasing function of the distance between them. 15 The proof uses a monotonicity argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 1, which shows that more central players cooperate more at every step of a sequence of vectors of actions that converges to the vector of robust maximum cooperation.
Theorem 4
With either global or local public goods, if player i is more central than player j, then
The inequality is strict if player i is strictly more central than player j and x k > 0 for all k 2 N .
The proof of the strict inequality in Theorem 4 uses the following lemma. 1 5 Formally, Theorem 4 holds whenever there exist a function f : R+ ! R+ and constants d 2 R+ such that
Lemma 2 Player i is more central than player j if and only if for all t 2 N there exists a surjection
Proof of Theorem 4. I prove the result for global public goods. The proof for local public goods is similar.
Let : R n + ! R n + , be de…ned as in the proof of Lemma 1; with a …xed monitoring network and global public goods, this simpli…es to x m k , this implies that
This holds for all t, which implies that
It follows by induction that x m i x m j for all m 2 N. To prove the strict inequality, suppose that player i is strictly more central than player j and that x k > 0 for all k 2 N . Rewrite (1) as
Suppose that i is more central than j and strictly 1-more central than j, let x min k x k (which is positive by assumption), let x max k x k , and let d be the diameter of L (i.e., the maximum distance between any two path-connected nodes in L). Then, by Lemma 2 and (2),
, as player i has at least one more distance-t neighbor than player j for some t 2 N. 16 Therefore, there exists " 1 > 0 such that x i x j " 1 > 0 whenever i is more central than j and strictly 1-more central than j. Now suppose that there exists " s > 0 such that x i x j " s > 0 whenever i is more central than j and strictly s-more central than j.
Suppose that i is more central than j and strictly s + 1-more central than j.
, by Lemma 2 and (2), which implies that there exists " s+1 > 0 such that x i x j " s+1 > 0. By induction on s, it follows that x i > x j whenever i is strictly more central than j.
Four remarks on Theorem 4 are in order. First, the conclusion of Theorem 4 would still hold for local public goods (but not global public goods) if the de…nition of centrality was weakened by specifying that player i is 1-more central than player j whenever #N (i) #N (j) (by essentially the same proof). Thus, players'robust maximum cooperation can be ordered for more networks with local public goods than with global public goods. Second, the …xed point equation (2) While this "exploitation" implies that more central players receive lower payo¤s than less central players with global public goods, Corollary 7 below implies that more central players receive higher payo¤s than less central players with local public goods, which shows that with local public goods the bene…t of having more neighbors more than o¤sets the cost of contributing more.
Fourth, my de…nition of centrality is related to Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987) . My de…nition of centrality is a partial order, as it ranks players in a way that is invariant to the bene…t function and discount factor, so a more direct comparison with Bonacich centrality results from comparing players'robust maximum cooperation for a …xed bene…t function, f , and discount factor, ; in this case, is analogous to the decay factor in the de…nition of Bonacich centrality, . Indeed, the formula for a player's robust maximum cooperation, (2) , is very similar to the formula for her
Bonacich centrality, with the important di¤erence that a player's robust maximum cooperation depends on other players' robust maximum cooperation through the concave function f , while this dependence in linear for Bonacich centrality. As a consequence, the vector of players'robust For general monitoring networks, it may be di¢ cult to verify that one player is more central than another, making it hard to apply Theorem 4. Sometimes, however, symmetries in the network can be exploited to determine which players are more central than others more easily. The remainder of this section shows how this can be done. Corollary 4 states that, if player i is closer to all players k 6 = i; j than is player j, then player i is more central than player j. Corollary 5 shows that if players i and k are in "symmetric"positions in the monitoring network (in that there exists a graph automorphism on L such that k = (i)) and player k is more central than player j, then player i is more central than player j as well. 17 Corollary 4 If d (i; k) d (j; k) for all k 6 = i; j, then player i is more central than player j. Player i is strictly more central than player j if in addition the inequality is strict for some k 6 = i; j.
Corollary 5
If there exists a graph automorphism : N ! N such that (i) is more central (resp., strictly more central) than j, then i is more central (resp., strictly more central) than j.
The "bow tie" network in Figure 3 illustrates the usefulness of Corollaries 4 and 5. 18 First, Corollary 4 immediately implies that player 3 is more central than players 1 and 2, and that player 5 is more central than players 6 and 7. Second, observe that the following map is an automorphism 1 7 A graph automorphism on L is a permutation on N such that li;j = l (i); (j) for all i; j 2 N . That is, a graph automorphism is a permutation of vertices that preserves links. 1 8 This example is the same as that in Figure 2 .13 of Jackson (2008), which Jackson uses to illustrate various graph-theoretic concepts of centrality. An impotant di¤erence between my de…nition and those discussed by Jackson is that my de…nition gives a partial order on nodes, while all the de…nitions discussed by Jackson give total orders.
of L: (1) = 7, (2) = 6, (3) = 5, (4) = 4, (5) = 3, (6) = 2, and (7) = 1. Thus, Corollary 5 implies that each player in f3; 5g is more central than each player in f1; 2; 6; 7g. Given this observation, it is not hard to show that player 4 is more central than each player in f1; 2; 6; 7g.
Finally, neither of players 3 and 4 are more central than the other, as player 3 has more immediate neighbors while player 4 has more neighbors within distance 2. Therefore, Theorem 5 does not say whether player 3 or player 4 has greater robust maximum cooperation. This is reassuring, because one can easily construct examples in which x 3 > x 4 and others in which the reverse inequality holds: for example, if f (x) = p x (with global public goods), then x 1 2:638, x 3 3:425, and is not surprising that player 3 contributes more relative to player 4 when is lower, as in this case the fact that player 3 has more immediate neighbors is more important, while player 4's greater number of distance-2 neighbors matters more when is higher (since 2 is low relative to when is low). However, there are networks in which a player i is not more central than player j but nonetheless x i x j for every concave bene…t function f and discount factor , as shown by Example A2 in the online appendix. This implies that centrality is not necessary to order players' maximum equilibrium cooperations for every bene…t function and discount factor.
As an aside, the bow tie network also provides an interesting example of how social welfare depends on network structure, and how this varies with the discount factor. When f (x) = p x, …rst-best cooperation is x F B = ((7 1) =2) 2 = 9, so robust maximum cooperation is below …rst-best for = 0:5 or 0:4. 19 Were the seven players arranged in a circle rather than a bow tie, then robust maximum cooperation would be 3:984 if = 0:5, and would be 1:777 if = 0:4. In particular, compared to the bow tie, utilitarian social welfare is much higher with monitoring on a circle when = 0:5, but is similar if = 0:4 (and is lower if = 0:3). The intuition is that the circle supports more cooperation relative to the bow tie when is higher, as when is higher players'lower average degree in the circle is more than o¤set by the circle's smaller diameter. More generally, networks that have lower average degree but also have shorter average distance between nodes that are not neighbors tend to support relatively more cooperation-and thus relatively greater e¢ ciency-when is higher.
Comparing Networks
This section shows that centrality is a key tool for comparing di¤erent networks in terms of their capacity to support cooperation, not just for comparing individuals within a …xed network. To see this, note that the "more central" relation can be immediately extended to pairs of players in di¤erent networks L 0 and L by specifying that player i 0 2 L 0 is more central than player i 2 L if player i 0 is more central than player i in the network consisting of disjoint components L 0 and L.
With this de…nition, the result is the following. Proof. Let d be the diameter of L (which is …nite because L is connected). Since player i 0 is more central than player i, Lemma 2 implies that there exists a surjection :
It is easy to see that Theorem 5 applies if L 0 L, in which case any surjection : L 0 ! L such that (i) = i for all i 2 L satis…es the condition of the theorem. This implies the following corollary, which formalizes in a natural way the widespread idea that better-connected societies can provide more public goods. 20 Corollary 6 Adding links to a network weakly increases each player's robust maximum cooperation.
However, Theorem 5 is much more general than this. For example, if L 0 is a circle with n 0 nodes and L is a circle with n nodes, then Theorem 5 applies whenever n 0 n. Similarly, if L 0 is a symmetric graph of degree k 0 on n nodes and L is a symmetric graph of degree k on n nodes, then Theorem 5 applies whenever k 0 k. Finally, the example in Figure 4 shows that Theorem 5 can even apply if L 0 and L have the same number of nodes and the same number of links (here, six and seven, respectively), because a simple application of Lemma 2 and Corollary 4 shows that players 1, 2, 5, and 6 are more central than players 7, 8, 11, and 12, and that players 3 and 4 are more central than players 9 and 10. 
Network Stability
This section brie ‡y considers the implications of allowing players to sever links in the monitoring network before the beginning of play. I assume that the resulting equilibrium involves each player making her robust maximum contribution with respect to the remaining monitoring network. I
show that, with local public good provision, no player ever has an incentive to sever a link, but that this is not true with global public good provision. Given that adding any link to a monitoring network increases all players'robust maximum cooperation (by Corollary 6), these results suggest that it may be easier to sustain monitoring networks that support high robust maximum cooperation with local public goods than with global public goods.
With local public goods, every player is made worse-o¤ when any link in the monitoring network is severed. This implies that any monitoring network is stable, in that no individual can bene…t from severing a link; if players can also add links, then only the complete network is stable. Note that a less restrictive de…nition of local public goods is needed for this result. Proof. Note that (1) simpli…es to x i = P j2N (i) f i;j x j . Therefore,
The set N (i) is weakly larger in L 0 than in L (in the set-inclusion sense), and by Corollary 6 every player's robust maximum cooperation is weakly greater with monitoring network L 0 than with monitoring network L. Hence, the result follows from (3).
Corollary 7 does not hold with global public goods. The key di¤erence between global and local public goods is that with global public goods a player can bene…t from another player's cooperation even if she is not observed by the other player, and in this case her own robust maximum cooperation is lower. Formally, with global public goods (3) becomes
This equation clari…es the tradeo¤ player i faces when deciding whether to sever a link with player j: severing the link increases d (i; k) for some players k 2 N , which increases u i x j n j=1 (by reducing player i's robust maximum cooperation x i ), but also decreases x k for some players k 2 N ,
. It is easy to construct examples where the …rst e¤ect dominates.
Conclusion
This paper studies repeated cooperation games with network monitoring and characterizes the robust maximum equilibrium level of cooperation and its dependence on group size and structure, where the notion of robustness is independence from players'information about others'information (holding …xed players'information about others'actions). The key theorem, which underlies all the results in the paper, is that robust maximum cooperation can be sustained by grim trigger strategies. This theorem is driven by an intuitive-but subtle-strategic complementarity between any two players'actions at any two on-path histories. With equal monitoring, robust maximum cooperation is typically increasing in group size with pure public goods and decreasing in group size with divisible public goods. In general, comparative statics on robust maximum cooperation depend on the product of the marginal bene…t of cooperation and the e¤ective contagiousness of the monitoring technology, which is thus identi…ed as the property of a monitoring technology that determines how much cooperation it can support. Less uncertain monitoring, which in some cases may be interpreted as reliable local monitoring rather than unreliable public monitoring, supports greater robust maximum cooperation. With a …xed monitoring network, a new notion of network centrality is developed, under which more central players have greater robust maximum cooperation. In addition, all players have greater robust maximum cooperation when the network is better connected, although better connected networks are more likely to be stable with local public goods than with global public goods.
I conclude by discussing some limitations of the current paper and the prospects for addressing them in future research. First, it would be interesting to compare the equilibrium that sustains robust maximum cooperation with equilibria that satisfy other desiderata, such as fairness (as payo¤s in the equilibrium that sustains maximum robust cooperation can be highly asymmetric).
It would also be interesting-though challenging-to try to say something about the set of payo¤s that can be robustly sustained, or the set of payo¤s that can be sustained with particular higherorder information structures.
Second, the assumption that players learn about actions only through network monitoring, rather than also observing public signals about aggregate outcomes, is very strong. For example, villagers certainly observe something about the quality of their schools and wells directly, in addition to observing others' contributions to their maintenance. An immediate observation here is that grim trigger strategy equilibria in games with only network monitoring continue to be equilibria when noisy public monitoring of aggregate outcomes (e.g., the sum of players'actions plus noise) is added to the game, as it is optimal for each player to ignore the public signal if everyone else does.
In general, more cooperation could be sustained by using the public signal as well as information from the network, so grim trigger would no longer be optimal; however, a natural conjecture is that grim trigger is approximately optimal when the public signal is very noisy. Studying such a model in detail could lead to insights about the interaction of public monitoring and network monitoring.
Third, while grim trigger strategies are robust in terms of the higher-order information structure, they are fragile in that one instance of shirking eventually leads to the complete breakdown of cooperation. This is especially problematic in (realistic) cases where the cost of cooperation is stochastic and is sometimes prohibitively high. Hence, extending the model to allow for stochastic costs of cooperation is important for deriving yet more robust predictions about which strategies best sustain cooperation, and also seems to be an interesting and challenging problem from a theoretical perspective.
Finally, my analysis makes strong predictions about the e¤ects of group size and structure on the level of public good provision, and on how these di¤er depending on whether the public good is pure or divisible and whether it is global or local. A natural next step would be to study these predictions empirically, either experimentally (as in the literature surveyed by Ledyard (1997) ) or with detailed …eld data of the kind that is increasingly being collected by development economists (e.g., Karlan et al, 2009; Banerjee et al, 2011 ).
x H 2 in period t 1 equals 1=2 1=2+(1=2)(1=2) = 2=3. Therefore, player 3's assessment of the probability that player 2 plays x H 2 in period t equals
In contrast, player 3's assessment of the probability that player 2 plays x H 2 in every period t + 1
Hence, since player 3's assessment of the probability that he himself plays x H 3 in period + 1 equals his assessment of the probability that player 2 plays x H 2 in period , for all , his continuation value after playing x H 3 in t equals
(1 )
r q
s q
De…ne x H 3 to be the number such that 1 It remains to show that this strategy pro…le is a PBE. The one-shot deviation principle applies, by standard arguments. Player 2 is indi¤erent among actions 0, x L 2 , and x H 2 at every on-path history, and clearly weakly prefers to play 0 at every o¤-path history, so he has no pro…table one-shot deviation (as any other deviation yields a lower stage-game payo¤ and a weakly lower continuation payo¤ than does x 2 = 0). It is also straightforward to verify that the fact that player 3 has no pro…table deviation after seeing player 2 play x H 2 in an odd-numbered period implies that he has no pro…table deviation at any history; in particular, all other one-shot incentive constraints of player 3's are slack. Finally, player 1's most pro…table deviation at any on-path history is playing x 1 = 0. If player 1 conforms in period t, for any t 1, her expected payo¤ equals
0:2505 0:71709.
If player 1 deviates to x 1 = 0 in an odd-numbered period, her expected payo¤ may be shown to
If player 1 deviates to x 1 = 0 in an even-numbered period t 2, her expected payo¤ is strictly less than this; intuitively, this is because if player 1's period-t deviation is unobserved, player 2 plays x H 2 in period t + 1 with probability 3=4 if t is odd but plays x H 2 with probability only 1=2 if t is even. In addition, it is clear that the di¤erence between player 1's expected payo¤ from conforming and from deviating to x 1 = 0 in period t = 0 is the same as the di¤erence between her expected payo¤ from conforming and from deviating to x 1 = 0 in any other even-numbered period.
Therefore, player 1 does not have a pro…table deviation at any on-path history. Finally, it can be veri…ed that deviating to x 1 = 0:2505 is not pro…table for player 1 at any o¤-path history, and it is clear that no other o¤-path deviation is pro…table.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Y P ; P denote a perfect higher-order information structure. There are three steps.
Step 1 shows that there exists a (component-wise) greatest vector (x i ) n i=1 satisfying (1), and also makes the technical point (used in Step 2d) that there exists an upper bound X 2 R + on any player's expected action, conditional on any set of monitoring realizations, at any time in any PBE.
Step 2 shows thatx i is an upper bound on player i's maximum cooperation, x i Y P ; P .
Step 3 exhibits a PBE in grim trigger strategies, , such that (1 )
=x i for all i, which proves that x i Y P ; P =x i for all i.
Step 1a: There exists a number X 2 R + such that for every 2 P BE Y P ; P , player i, time t, and set of monitoring realizations up to time t, F , E i h t i jF X and P j6 =i f i;j X X < 0.
Proof: Recall that (1 )
jF is well-de…ned for all sets of monitoring realizations, F , by assumption. The assumptions that f j;i is concave for all j; i and
For every player i, let X 0 i 2 R + be the number such that the sum of the players'continuation payo¤s from period t onward equals 0 when player i plays X 0 i in period t, every player j 6 = i plays x F B j in period t, and every player j (including player i) plays x F B j in every subsequent period; that is, X 0 i is de…ned by
n k=1 jF < 0 whenever E i h t i jF > X 0 for some player i. Now if h t j is a history with perfect higher-order information, then h t j determines the monitoring realization up to time t, and thus whether F has occurred, so (1 )
0 with positive probability, conditional on F . But (1 )
any on-path history h t j , because 2 P BE Y P ; P and 0 is each player's minmax value. Hence, E i h t i jF X 0 for every player i.
Finally, for every player i, the assumption that lim x 1 !1 P j6 =i f i;j (x 1 ) x 1 < 0 (combined with concavity of f i;j ) implies there exists a number X i 2 R + such that
for all x 1 X i . Taking X max X 0 ; max i2N X i completes the proof.
Step 1b: There exists a greatest vector (x i ) n i=1 satisfying (1), andx i X for all i.
Proof: De…ne the function :
The …xed points of are precisely those vectors satisfying (1) . Observe that is isotone. In addition, (1 )
. Hence, the image of the set 0; X n under is contained in 0; X n .
Therefore, Tarski's …xed point theorem implies that has a greatest …xed point (x i ) n i=1 in the set 0; X n . Finally, if x i > X for some player i, then there exists a player j (possibly equal to i) such
This implies that every …xed point of must lie in the set 0; X n , and it follows that (x i ) n i=1 is the greatest vector satisfying (1). 21 Step 2a: If 2 P BE Y P ; P , then for every player i and every on-path history h t i ,
Proof: Fix strategy pro…le , player i, and on-path history h t i . For any player j and history h j , let E h f i;j j h j jh t i ; 0 i be the expectation of f i;j j h j conditional on each player k 6 = i following k , player i following i at every time < t, history h t i being reached, and player i playing 2 1 As an aside, note that the vector (xi) . Thus, computing the vector of robust maximum cooperation is like computing the greatest equilibrium in a supermodular game (cf Milgrom and Roberts (1990) ).
x i = 0 at every time t. If 2 P BE Y P ; P , then player i's expected payo¤ from conforming to from h t i onward is weakly greater than her expected payo¤ from playing x i = 0 at every time t. That is,
or, equivalently,
Observe that, conditional on the event j = 2 D ( ; t; i), the probability distribution over histories h j does not depend on player i's actions following history h t i . Therefore,
Hence, the right-hand side of (6) equals
which is not more than the right-hand side of (5). Therefore, the fact that (6) holds for all players i and on-path histories h t i implies that (5) holds for all players i and on-path histories h t i .
Step 2b: For every player i, de…ne the random variable X t i by
The right-hand side of (5) is not more than
Proof: Fix a player j. To simplify notation, de…ne the random variable X t i;j by X t i;j
(1 ) P 1 =t t f i;j j h j ; this notation is used only in this step of the proof. Note that
where the second equality uses the fact that Pr (j 2 D (t 1; t; i)) = 0, the third equality uses the fact that D ( 1; t; i) D ( ; t; i), and the inequality uses concavity of f i;j and Jensen's inequality.
Summing over j 6 = i completes the proof.
Step 2c: If 2 P BE Y P ; P , then for every player i, time t, and subset of monitoring realizations up to time t, F ,
Pr (j 2 D ( ; t; i) nD ( 1; t; i)) f i;j E X j jj 2 D ( ; t; i) nD ( 1; t; i) ; F Proof: If 2 P BE Y P ; P , then (5) and Step 2b imply that, for every player i and every on-path history h t i ,
Thus, by concavity of f i;j , and Jensen's inequality,
Pr (j 2 D ( ; t; i) nD ( 1; t; i)) f i;j E E X j jh t i ; j 2 D ( ; t; i) nD ( 1; t; i) jF .
Finally, perfect higher-order information implies that h t i (or h t j ) determines the monitoring realization up to time t (and thus whether the events j 2 D ( ; t; i) nD ( 1; t; i) and F have occurred),
and
Step 2d: If 2 P BE Y P ; P , then E X 0 i x i . In addition, if 2 P BE Y P ; P and X for all t, by Step 1a, and therefore
Suppose the result is proved for some m 2 N.
, where the …rst inequality follows by Step 2c and the second inequality follows by the inductive hypothesis.
Since is isotone,x i
x m i for all m 2 N, and in additionx i i (lim m!1 x m i ). Also, is continuous, which implies that i (lim m!1 x m i ) = lim m!1 x m i . The fact thatx is the greatest …xed point of thus implies thatx = lim m!1 x m . Therefore, the fact that E X t i jF x m i for all m 2 N implies that E X t i jF x i . Taking t = 0 and F = ; yields E X 0 i x i .
Step 3: Let be the strategy pro…le given by i h t i =x i if z i;j; 2 fx j ; ;g for all z i;j; 2 h t i , and i h t i = 0 otherwise, for all i. Then 2 P BE Y P ; P , and E X 0 i =x i for all i.
Proof: It is immediate that E X 0 i =x i for all i. To see that 2 P BE Y P ; P , note that the one-shot deviation principle applies, by standard arguments. I …rst show that no player has a pro…table one-shot deviation at any on-path history, and then show that no player has a pro…table one-shot deviation at any o¤-path history.
Fix a player i and an on-path history h t i . Ifx i = 0, then it is clear that player i does not have a pro…table deviation at h t i . So suppose thatx i > 0. Player i's continuation payo¤ if she conforms to equals P j6 =i f i;j (x j ) x i . The most pro…table deviation from is playing x i = 0, as every other deviation yields the same continuation payo¤ and a lower stage-game payo¤. I claim that player i's continuation payo¤ (including period t) after such a deviation equals 
Given this claim, the di¤erence between player i's payo¤ from conforming to and from playing her most pro…table deviation equals
Pr (j 2 D ( ; t; i)) f i;j (x j ) x i , which equals 0 because the vector (x i ) n i=1 satis…es (1) . Therefore, to show that player i has no pro…table deviation, it su¢ ces to prove that player i's continuation payo¤ after playing x i = 0 at on-path history h t i equals (8) . If player i deviates from at on-path history h t i and j = 2 D ( ; t; i) for some player j and time , then j h j =x j . Hence, the claim that player i's continuation payo¤ equals (8) is equivalent to the claim that j h j = 0 whenever j 2 D ( ; t; i) and Pr (j 2 D ( ; t; i)) > 0. Thus, suppose that player i plays x i = 0 at on-path history h t i , that Pr (j 2 D ( ; t; i)) > 0, and that the monitoring realization up to time , L , is such that j 2 D ( ; t; i) given L and Pr ((L s ) s=0 = L ) > 0. I claim that j h j = 0 given L . This claim is trivial ifx j = 0, so assume thatx j > 0. Proceed by induction on : If = t + 1, then z j;i;t = 0 given L , so the fact that 0 = 2 fx i ; ;g implies that j h j = 0. Suppose that the claim holds for all 0 , and consider the case where = 0 + 1.
Since j 2 D ( 0 + 1; t; i), player j observes the action of some player k 2 D ( 0 ; t; i) at time 0
given L , and the fact that Pr ((L s ) s=0 = L ) > 0 implies that Pr (j 2 D ( 0 + 1; 0 ; k)) > 0.
Sincex j > 0, the fact that Pr (j 2 D ( 0 + 1; 0 ; k)) > 0 implies thatx k > 0, by the de…nition of
. Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis, k h 0 j = 0 given L , and 0 = 2 fx k ; ;g. Hence, j h j = 0, completing the proof of the claim. It remains only to show that no player has a pro…table deviation at any o¤-path history. Intuitively, given that each player i is indi¤erent between playing x i =x i and x i = 0 at every on-path history h t i , this follows from Ellison's (1994) observation that a player's incentive to cooperate in a grim trigger strategy pro…le is reduced after a shirking by another player. Formally, for any subset of players S N , de…ne D ( ; t; S) by D ( ; t; S) = ; if < t D (t; t; S) = S D ( + 1; t; S) = fj : z j;k; = x k; for some k 2 D ( ; t; S)g if t;
note that this generalizes the de…nition of D ( ; t; i). Fix a player i and an o¤-path history h t i . If player i has a pro…table deviation from at h t i , it must be playing x i =x i , as all other actions yield the same continuation payo¤ as x i = 0 and a strictly lower stage game payo¤. By a similar argument to that in the previous two paragraphs, ifD (t) is set of players such that z i;j; = 2 fx j ; ;g for some z i;j; 2 h t i , then the di¤erence between player i's payo¤ from conforming to and her payo¤ from deviating to x i =x i (and subsequently following ) equalŝ where the last equality follows because P 1 =t t P j6 =i Pr (j 2 D ( ; t; i)) f i;j (x j ) =x i = (1 ) and P 1 =t t P j6 =i Pr (j 2 D ( ; t + 1; i)) f i;j (x j ) = x i = (1 ). Hence, player i does not have a pro…table deviation at history h t i for any setD (t), and therefore player i does not have a pro…table deviation at history h t i for any belief about the vector of private histories h t j n j=1 .
Proof of Theorem 1. Let be as in Lemma 1. The proof of Step 3 of the proof of Lemma 1 applies as written to any higher-order information structure. Therefore, 2 P BE (Y; ) for any (Y; ). Since E X 0 i =x i for all i, it follows by the de…nition of x i that x i x i for all i. On the other hand, Step 2d of the proof of Lemma 1 implies that x i Y P ; P x i for all i, and therefore
x i x i for all i. Hence, x i =x i for all i, and it follows that robustly sustains each player's maximum robust cooperation.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Theorem 1, it su¢ ces to show thatx i =x j for all i; j 2 N . Let P n k 0 =0 k 0 g t k (k 0 ). By Theorem 2, it su¢ ces to show that
I claim thatG t k strictly second-order stochastically dominates G t k for all t 1 and k 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g, which is equivalent to P k 0 s=0G t k (s) < P k 0 s=0 G t k (s) for all t 1 and k 0 2 fk; : : : ; n 1g. 23 The proof is by induction on t. The t = 1 case is the assumption thatG k strictly second-order 2 3 Note that this claim implies that P 1 (s) (by the claim), and the fourth line follows from undoing the rearrangement of the …rst line. Summing over t completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. If such a surjection exists for all t 2 N, taking t = 0 implies that player i is more central than player j.
For the converse, I …rst claim that if player i is s-more central than player j, then player i is there exists a player k 0 2 1 (k) such that k 0 is s-more central than k for all s s. By the claim, k 0 is also s m-more central than k for all m, so k 0 is s-more central than k for all s 2 N and is therefore more central than k.
